China's Ambitious Satellite Internet Plan Faces Significant Hurdles

The night sky is increasingly crisscrossed by trails of satellites, a visible sign of the burgeoning low Earth orbit (LEO) internet constellation race. While Elon Musk's Starlink, operated by SpaceX, currently dominates this landscape with over 7,000 satellites, new players are rapidly entering the arena. Among the most ambitious are two massive projects from China, known officially as Guowang and Qianfan. These initiatives aim to deploy a combined total of approximately 28,000 satellites, potentially offering a significant challenge to Starlink's global dominance. However, as these Chinese constellations begin their initial deployments, they are encountering substantial obstacles that threaten to slow their progress and complicate their path to success.

Since August of last year, China has launched more than 100 satellites for these two networks. Guowang, also referred to as Xingwang or SatNet, appears primarily focused on serving domestic telecommunications needs and supporting national security objectives. Qianfan, known alternatively as Spacesail or SSST, is targeting the international market, actively pursuing partnerships with foreign telecom providers. Qianfan has already secured preliminary agreements with countries like Brazil, Malaysia, and Thailand, and has expressed interest in expanding its reach to dozens of other nations across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

While China's efforts represent a significant step forward in the global LEO broadband market, they are clearly still in the early stages compared to Starlink's established network. Nevertheless, Guowang and Qianfan are part of a growing cohort of Starlink competitors worldwide, including projects from Amazon (Project Kuiper) and Eutelsat (OneWeb), all vying for a share of the future satellite internet market. This increased competition could benefit consumers and businesses globally, offering alternatives to Starlink. Furthermore, the geopolitical landscape, particularly concerns surrounding Elon Musk's increasing political involvement and its potential impact on Starlink's reliability and neutrality, could create opportunities for competitors like Qianfan in international markets.

Jonathan McDowell, a respected astronomer at the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory who meticulously tracks global satellite constellations, notes the increasing activity beyond Starlink. "2023 and 2024 were the years of Starlink deployment. 2025 is the year of other actors getting into the game," McDowell observes. He adds that the commercial side of China's space industry is often underestimated in Western analysis.

However, the initial phase of deployment for Guowang and Qianfan has not been without its difficulties. Reports indicate higher rates of satellite anomalies compared to SpaceX's early launches, alongside significant bureaucratic hurdles and limitations in China's rocket launch capabilities. These challenges are not merely technical or logistical; they also have implications for China's ability to meet international regulatory requirements. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the UN body responsible for coordinating space launches and spectrum allocation, mandates that companies make steady progress on their constellations after reserving spectrum. Failure to meet these milestones could force China to scale back the ambitious planned sizes of Guowang and Qianfan.

Neither Guowang nor Qianfan responded to requests for comment regarding their progress and challenges. SpaceX also did not immediately provide a comment.

Technical Hurdles: Faulty Satellites and Orbital Challenges

As of last month, Qianfan had launched 90 satellites intended for broadband service, while Guowang had launched 29. Guowang has also sent approximately a dozen experimental satellites into orbit since 2023, though their specific purpose remains unclear, and they are not typically included in the official constellation count.

Despite Qianfan's slight lead in deployment numbers, it appears to be facing a notable issue with satellite reliability. Unlike Starlink, which provides public GPS data for its satellites, Chinese companies offer limited transparency regarding the status and performance of their spacecraft. Consequently, researchers like Jonathan McDowell rely heavily on publicly available data collected by the US Space Force, which tracks space objects via radar.

McDowell's analysis suggests that out of the 90 satellites launched by Qianfan, 13 have exhibited irregular behavior, specifically failing to ascend to their intended operational orbit alongside their counterparts. The second batch of 18 satellites launched by Qianfan in October 2024 was particularly problematic, with only five successfully reaching their planned altitude, according to McDowell's data.

While these satellites might not be completely inoperable—some could be in a dormant state awaiting optimal positioning—their collective performance indicates a higher anomaly rate compared to established constellations. Starlink, for instance, began with an initial failure rate of around 3 percent, which has since decreased to less than 0.5 percent, according to McDowell's tracking. OneWeb, the British constellation with over 600 satellites, has only two satellites currently stuck in non-operational orbits.

Reports from sources like the Shanghai local government suggest that Qianfan's second batch of satellites was manufactured by a different supplier, Genesat. A press release issued at the time of the launch indicated that this was Genesat's first delivery of mass-produced satellites, potentially explaining the performance disparity compared to earlier batches.

Adding to the technical challenges, both Guowang and Qianfan have chosen to deploy their satellites in higher orbits than Starlink. While specific orbital altitudes vary within each constellation, operating at higher elevations means that failed satellites are more difficult and costly to deorbit. This increases the likelihood that malfunctioning spacecraft will remain in orbit for extended periods, contributing to the growing problem of space debris. Given the sheer scale of the planned Chinese constellations, a higher failure rate at these altitudes could significantly exacerbate orbital congestion.

Victoria Samson, chief director of space security and stability at the Secure World Foundation, a non-profit dedicated to outer space sustainability, highlights the potential consequences of increased orbital traffic. "What can happen is that you will have so many satellites operating in the same orbital shell that you're constantly having to move your satellite out of concerns of close approach," Samson explains. This constant maneuvering creates logistical burdens and incurs additional costs for all satellite operators sharing those orbital planes.

Samson emphasizes the urgent need for international coordination mechanisms to manage space traffic and prevent collisions as the number of mega-constellations grows. "Right now, there's no real space traffic control system," she notes, underscoring a critical gap in global space governance.

Operational Bottlenecks: Launch Capacity and Bureaucracy

While China's projects are ahead of some newer entrants like Amazon's Project Kuiper, which launched its first 27 satellites in April, they lag significantly behind Starlink in terms of deployment speed and scale. This gap is particularly concerning given the ambitious targets set by Guowang and Qianfan and the regulatory deadlines imposed by the ITU.

Under ITU regulations, companies must launch their first satellite within seven years of reserving radio frequency spectrum. Following the first launch, they have another seven years to make substantial progress towards completing their constellation, typically requiring 10 percent of the planned satellites to be in orbit within that timeframe. For Guowang and Qianfan, which began launching non-experimental satellites last year, the clock is ticking. They will need to have approximately 10 percent of their combined 28,000 satellites in orbit by 2026 to avoid potential pressure from the ITU to reduce their planned constellation sizes.

Compared to Starlink's rapid deployment pace—which saw nearly 2,000 satellites launched within two years of its first batch in May 2019—the Chinese projects appear to be moving slower than initially anticipated by many observers.

Guowang, in particular, has progressed more slowly than expected since its ITU registration in 2020. Blaine Curcio, founder of Orbital Gateway Consulting, a market research firm specializing in the Chinese space industry, notes the initial high expectations. "Everybody, myself included, was expecting there to be a pretty quick ramp up, because they had a lot of money, they had a lot of support, and they had this government mandate" to establish a Chinese equivalent to Starlink, Curcio says.

Guowang's close ties to the central government and its leadership drawn from large state-owned enterprises may be contributing to bureaucratic inefficiencies. This traditional, top-down management style can hinder the rapid, agile decision-making often required for fast-paced technology deployment. "They're just not going to move fast and break things," Curcio explains, contrasting it with the more entrepreneurial approach often seen in private space companies.

Qianfan, while also receiving state backing (from the Shanghai municipal government), is perceived by experts as operating with a more modern business structure. Its leadership includes executives with experience in finance and business sectors, which may explain its relatively faster pace compared to Guowang.

However, both projects face a common and significant bottleneck: the availability of suitable rockets. While China conducts a substantial number of launches annually, this capacity is shared among various national space programs, including missions for navigation, remote sensing, and scientific research. This limits the dedicated launch opportunities available for the large-scale deployment required by mega-constellations.

Crucially, China currently lacks operational reusable rocket technology comparable to SpaceX's Falcon 9. Reusability has been a cornerstone of Starlink's ability to achieve high launch cadence and reduce costs, enabling the rapid deployment of thousands of satellites. Without this capability, China's launch costs per satellite remain higher, and the frequency of launches is constrained by the production rate of new rockets.

Qianfan's attempts to address this issue highlight the challenge. The company issued two public procurement requests for rocket suppliers this year, both of which were unsuccessful due to insufficient bids. While several Chinese commercial space companies are actively developing reusable launch vehicles, none are yet ready for the high-tempo, reliable launches needed for constellation deployment. "It's possible that in the next couple of years we'll start to see that that bottleneck get resolved, but it's also possible that it remains a pretty substantial bottleneck," Curcio cautions.

Market Strategy: Domestic Security vs. International Competition

So far, Guowang and Qianfan appear to be pursuing distinct market strategies, potentially avoiding direct competition with each other. Guowang, with its stronger central government ties, seems positioned to handle use cases with national security implications. Reports, such as one published by The Atlantic Council, suggest that China's military drills around Taiwan have included efforts to test and validate Guowang's capabilities in the region, potentially for directing missiles or providing secure communications during a conflict in the West Pacific.

Qianfan, conversely, is explicitly positioning itself as an international competitor to Starlink. A map presented by Qianfan representatives at a Chinese space industry conference last year indicated active operations in six markets: Brazil, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. The map also outlined plans to enter two dozen additional markets in 2025, including strategically important countries like India, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Argentina, and numerous nations across Africa.

Qianfan may find fertile ground in international markets, particularly as some countries grow increasingly wary of Starlink's close ties to the US government and the potential implications of Elon Musk's political stances. A notable example is Musk's decision in 2023 to restrict Starlink service to Ukraine during its conflict with Russia, a move that highlighted the potential for a single entity to control access to critical communication infrastructure during geopolitical events.

Furthermore, Starlink's technical architecture, where newer satellites can provide service without routing data through local internet gateways, can be a point of concern for governments seeking greater control over domestic internet traffic and data sovereignty. "As I understand, Qianfan has chosen to not do this, as a way of giving countries more peace of mind with regard to landing traffic locally," Curcio notes, suggesting Qianfan's design choice could be a deliberate strategy to appeal to countries prioritizing local data control.

Many international telecom companies have also expressed frustration with Starlink's business practices. Starlink has often partnered with multiple competing local resellers simultaneously and has increasingly moved towards offering direct-to-customer services, which can cut into the profits of its local partners. Measat, the Malaysian satellite communications company that signed a preliminary deal with Qianfan, was initially a Starlink reseller. Starlink's subsequent expansion of its reseller network and direct sales channels likely impacted Measat's business, potentially making a partnership with Qianfan, which currently focuses solely on providing satellite internet capabilities to local telcos, a more attractive and less competitive option.

"From a commercial angle, if you make a deal with Starlink, it's like making a deal with the devil. Eventually Starlink is going to go behind your back and try to take your customers from you and sell to them directly," Curcio argues, summarizing the sentiment of some potential Starlink partners who might view Qianfan as a more reliable and less disruptive wholesale provider.

The Broader Implications of a Competing Space Internet

The emergence of large-scale Chinese LEO constellations like Guowang and Qianfan is not just a commercial development; it has significant geopolitical and strategic implications. A world with multiple, independent global satellite internet networks introduces new dynamics in connectivity, information flow, and potential conflict.

For China, these constellations are a key part of its broader space ambitions and its drive for technological self-sufficiency. They represent an effort to reduce reliance on foreign-controlled infrastructure, particularly in critical areas like communications. Guowang's focus on domestic and security applications aligns with China's strategic goals of enhancing its military capabilities and ensuring resilient communication networks within its borders and areas of interest.

Qianfan's international push, on the other hand, is a form of digital diplomacy and economic expansion. By offering satellite internet services to countries in the Global South, particularly those involved in China's Belt and Road Initiative, China can strengthen technological ties, provide alternative connectivity options, and potentially gain influence. This strategy mirrors China's efforts in other technology sectors, such as telecommunications equipment (e.g., Huawei), where it has sought to provide alternatives to Western suppliers.

The competition between Starlink and the Chinese constellations also raises questions about the future of internet governance and access. Will countries be forced to choose sides based on geopolitical alignment? Will the existence of multiple networks lead to a more fragmented global internet? Or will it foster greater resilience and competition, ultimately benefiting users?

The issue of space debris remains a critical concern regardless of who is launching satellites. The sheer number of spacecraft planned by all major players, coupled with the challenges of deorbiting failed satellites, increases the risk of collisions and could render certain orbital altitudes unusable in the future. This underscores the urgent need for international cooperation on space traffic management and debris mitigation, a challenge made more complex by geopolitical rivalries.

Furthermore, the development of these constellations highlights the dual-use nature of space technology. While primarily intended for civilian broadband internet, LEO satellite networks have inherent military applications, including communication, surveillance, and potentially targeting. The close ties between Guowang and the Chinese government raise particular concerns in this regard, especially in the context of regional tensions.

Looking Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities

China's effort to build competitors to Starlink is undoubtedly off to a challenging start. The technical issues with satellite reliability, particularly for Qianfan, are a significant hurdle that needs to be addressed through improved manufacturing processes and quality control. The limitations in launch capacity, especially the lack of operational reusable rockets, represent a fundamental constraint on deployment speed and cost-effectiveness. Overcoming this will require successful development and deployment of new launch technologies by Chinese commercial space companies.

Bureaucratic inefficiencies, particularly within state-backed entities like Guowang, could continue to slow progress unless management structures and decision-making processes are streamlined. Meeting the ITU deadlines will require a substantial acceleration in launch cadence over the next couple of years, a feat that will test the limits of China's current space infrastructure.

Despite these significant challenges, China possesses considerable resources and a strong political will to succeed in space. The government's strategic focus on LEO constellations as critical national infrastructure provides strong backing for Guowang and Qianfan. The potential market, both domestically within China and internationally, is vast.

Qianfan's strategy of focusing on partnerships with local telecom companies and offering a model that respects local data sovereignty could prove appealing to many countries hesitant about Starlink's approach. The geopolitical climate, marked by increasing distrust and competition between major powers, may inadvertently create opportunities for China to position its satellite networks as a neutral or preferred alternative in certain regions.

The coming years will be critical for both Guowang and Qianfan. Their ability to overcome technical setbacks, ramp up launch capabilities, navigate bureaucratic complexities, and meet international regulatory requirements will determine whether they can truly emerge as viable competitors to Starlink and reshape the global satellite internet landscape. The race for space internet dominance is far from over, and while China faces a bumpy road ahead, its ambition and progress warrant close observation.